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NOTES
ACCOMMODATING LEARNING DISABLED
STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
SCHOOLS' LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
Today, more and more learning disabled students are demand-
ing the equal opportunity to attend colleges and universities.' These
students have a disorder that impairs one or more of the cognitive
processes involved in understanding or using language. 2 As a result,
learning disabled individuals may have an impaired ability in speak-
ing, reading, or writing. 3 Because of their mental difficulties, learn-
ing disabled students had historically been labeled as not being
college material.' In the 1988-89 school year, however, thirty-six
percent of the postsecondary students who reported having a hand-
icap also reported that they had a learning disability. 5
 Over the past
few years, the percentage of learning disabled persons attending
institutions of higher education has increased more rapidly than
the percentage of students with any other reported disability. 6
These statistics result, in part, from broad education legislation,
such as the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975
("EAHCA"). 7 This act provides for special education programs in
public schools, such as programs for the early detection of learning
' Sears, Learning Disabilities, Postsecondary Education, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 12 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 61, 69 (1988).
2 Education of All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975 ("EAHCA"), 20 U.S.C.
§ 401(a)(15) (1988).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 D. CLARK, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF HANDICAPPED STLIDEN'F SERVICE PROGRAMS IN
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: SURVEY OF PROGRAMS, 4 (1990). For more information regarding
this survey, contact Dr. Donald M. Clark, National Association for Industry-Education Co-
operation (N A I EC).
6 Id.
'1 Rothstein, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Emerging Issues for Colleges and Universities,
13 IC.
	 U.L. 229, 230 (1986). See EAFICA, 220 U.S.C. § 1400-1461 (1985).
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disabilities and for the special education of learning disabled stu-
dents. 8 Furthermore, under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 ("section 504"), no otherwise qualified handicapped persons
can be excluded from any program receiving federal financial as-
sistance solely because of their handicap. 9 A large percentage of
colleges and universities are recipients of federal financial assistance
and, thus, must comply with section 504. 10 Section 504's regulations
mandate that those colleges and universities that receive federal
financial aid provide reasonable academic accommodations to their
disabled students in order to ensure equal access to ,higher educa-
tion."
Commentators have noted that although case law has devel-
oped in the general area of the application of section 504 to higher
education, there are still many unanswered questions, including the
types of accommodations that schools must provide learning dis-
abled students.' 2 Moreover, commentators note that litigation in
this area is likely to increase due to the large numbers of learning
disabled students in higher education." Consequently, universities
must examine what accommodations section 504 requires that they
provide to learning disabled students to protect against section 504
suits."
This note will focus on what institutions of higher education
must provide for handicapped students in order to comply with
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Although section 504 applies
to all handicapped students, this note will pay particular attention
to the special concerns of learning disabled students. Section I will
review the legislative and regulatory history of section 504, as well
as discuss the broad policies behind section 504 and how these
policies relate to the specific regulatory requirements designed to
effectuate section 504. 15 Section II will then examine judicial inter-
pretation of section 504 with respect to disabled students in postse-
See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 230 n.8.
° 29 U.S.C. §§ 794(a),(b) (1988). Under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
"frilo otherwise qualified individual with handicaps . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance ...."
'° Rothstein, supra note 7, at 229.
" See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4, 84.44 (1989).
15 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 7, at 230.
" Id. at 234.
14 See, e.g., id. at 230-31.
15
 See infra notes 23-98 and accompanying text.
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condary education. 16 This discussion will focus on the special con-
cerns that learning disabled students face, such as documentation
requirements. It will also examine the concerns that institutions of
higher education face in complying with section 504, such as issues
related to cost and academic integrity. 17 Finally, section III will
analyze the current status of the law on these issues, and will provide
guidance for universities in structuring learning disabled programs
that are effective for learning disabled students and meet section
504 requirements. 18
I. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Commentators have noted that the legislative and regulatory
history of section 504 defines its scope. 19 The legislative history of
section 504, and the later amendments to it, indicate that Congress
intended section 504 to be a broad civil rights act aimed at providing
equal opportunities for the handicapped. 2° Furthermore, its regu-
latory history emphasizes section 504's purposes of equal opportu-
nity and nondiscrimination. 2 ' The regulations themselves discuss
the types of academic accommodations that schools must provide
for their handicapped students to protect against discrimination. 22
A. The Legislative History of Section 504
Commentators have noted that when Congress first passed sec-
tion 504, the paucity of explicit legislative history made it difficult
to determine the section's scope." Congress stated generally that
section 504 prohibits discrimination and the exclusion of benefits
on the basis of handicaps to otherwise qualified individuals partic-
ipating in any program receiving federal financial assistance." Con-
16 See infra notes 108-248 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 169-248 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 267-362 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 23-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of section
504.
'° See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of section 504.
" See infra notes 45-98 and accompanying text For a discussion of section 504's regu-
lations.
22 See infra notes 58-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the specific accom-
modations required under the HEW regulations.
Note, Disparate Impact and Meaningful Access Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
16 Conn. L. REV. 609, 610 (1984).
S. REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 119, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE Conc. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2143.
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gress also stated that it intended section 504 to ensure that federally
assisted programs would not exclude handicapped persons simply
because a handicap appeared to be too severe. 25
Following the passage of section 504, scholars commented that
these general statements of intent made it uncertain whether section
504 merely represented a general philosophy of nondiscrimination
against the handicapped or whether it represented the beginning
of a substantial civil rights movement for the handicapped. 26 In
1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act ("amendments" ). 2'
The passage of these amendments somewhat clarified the uncer-
tainty surrounding section 504's scope, although they involved no
specific changes to section 504. 28 Rather, Congress made technical
and clarifying changes to the Rehabilitation Act as a whole with
these amendments. 29 Nonetheless, accompanying these changes, the
legislature made more explicit statements of the policy behind sec-
tion 504. 3°
For example, the Senate reports pertaining to the 1974 amend-
ments explicitly stated that Congress had modeled section 504 after
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 ' The Senate reports further
explained that section 504 established a broad government policy
that colleges and universities receiving federal financial assistance
shall operate without discrimination on the basis of handicap. 32
Furthermore, Senator Humphrey remarked that the framers of
section 504 aimed to provide equal opportunities for the handi-
capped."
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments also provided
some guidelines for the enforcement of section 504. 34 Congress
R5
	 at 2079.
" Note, supra note 23, at 610.
27 Id. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6374-75.
28 See S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6374-75.
29 Id.
See Note, supra note 23, at 610.
II S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6390. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
contains virtually the same anti-discrimination language as section 504—"No person in the
United States shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," 42 U.S.C. at § 2000d-1.
u S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6390.
33 118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972).
s' S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6390-91.
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stated that although section 504 does not explicitly mandate the
issuance of regulations, Congress intended that the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") issue such regulations."
During Senate subcommittee meetings on the proposed amend-
ments, HEW officials stated that HEW would treat section 504 as
civil rights legislation, and that it would interpret section 504
broadly to correct all types of discrimination against handicapped
individuals in federally-assisted programs." Thus, the Secretary of
HEW assumed the responsibility for coordinating regulations and
enforcement procedures. 37
In sum, when Congress first passed section 504, the legislative
history stated generally that section 504 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap, leaving commentators uncertain as to the
scope of section 504. 33 The legislative history accompanying the
1974 amendments, however, demonstrates that section 504 is a
broad civil rights act." This legislative history also reveals that the
purpose of section 504 is to provide equal opportunities to handi-
capped persons. 4° Furthermore, it clearly indicates that Congress
intended that HEW issue regulations to clarify section 504 further,
and that HEW intended to interpret section 504 broadly when
promulgating these regulations.'"
B. The Regulatory History of Section 504
In 1978, the Secretary of HEW responded to Congress's intent
that HEW promulgate section 504 regulations by issuing regulations
("1978 regulations") to effectuate section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.42 These regulations define a number of section 504's terms."
They also describe the discrimination prohibited under section 504,
and discuss the types of modifications that federally-assisted schools
35 Id. at 6391.
3° Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1471, 1479 (1987).
" S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6391.
sa See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 504's legis-
lative history.
" See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
accompanying the 1974 amendments to section 504.
40 See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of Senator Humphrey's
statements regarding the purpose of section 504.
" See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role that Congress
intended HEW to play in effectuating section 504.
42 See generally, 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1989).
45 Id.
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must make in their programs to provide for handicapped individ-
uals . 44
1. Definitional Aspects of the HEW Regulations
Specifically, the 1978 regulations further define section 504's
definition of handicapped individuals. 45 For example, section 504's
definition of handicapped persons includes those with "mental im-
pairments."46 The regulations expanded on the definition of hand-
icapped persons to include persons having any mental or psycho-
logical disorder such as specific learning disabilities. 47
Although the regulations do not define "specific learning dis-
abilities," the regulations HEW promulgated to enforce the EAHCA
define learning disabilities.° Under EAHCA's regulations, the term
"specific learning disability" refers to a disorder in one or a few of
the psychological processes involved in comprehending or using
oral or written language." These regulations also provide that man-
ifestations of such a disorder may include an impaired ability to
read, speak or spe11. 5° Courts have applied this definition of learning
disabilities in cases involving section 504 claims. 5 '
Additionally, in defining the types of discrimination that section
504 prohibits, the 1978 regulations stress section 504's purpose of
equal opportunity.52 Specifically, the regulations state that rather
than ensuring equal results in education, section 504 only requires
that federally-assisted programs provide handicapped students
equal opportunities to achieve the same results." Furthermore, the
regulations state that schools must provide an integrated setting for
their handicapped students." Thus, although section 504 does not
B Id. §i 84.4, 84.44 (1989). On May 9, 1980, the Department of Education was created
and these regulations were transferred to this new department. The regulations are now
located, in substantially the same form, at 35 C.F.R. § 104 (1989) as well as at 45 C.F.R. § 84
(1989) where they were originally placed by HEW.
45
 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j).
44 Id. § 84.3(j)(1)(i).
42 Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B)•
" 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(9) (1989). This act mandates primary and secondary schools to
provide special education programs for handicapped students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988).
42 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(9) (1989).
5° Id.
See, e.g., Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1991) (learning
disabled student handicapped under § 504).
52 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1989).
55 Id.
M Id.
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require affirmative action, courts have noted that it may require
postsecondary schools to make modifications in their academic pro-
grams to accommodate their handicapped students."
2. Reasonable Accommodation Requirements of the HEW Regu-
lations
a. Modification of Academic Requirements
The 1978 regulations also discuss what academic modifications
postsecondary institutions must make for handicapped students. 56
Under these regulations, schools must modify their academic re-
quirements to ensure nondiscrimination of handicapped students. 57
For example, one regulation directs postsecondary institutions to
modify examinations for students with handicaps that impair their
sensory, manual or language skills. 58 This regulation states that
schools must provide examination formats that will best ensure
results reflecting the student's abilities rather than the student's
disability. 59 David Matthews, Secretary of HEW at the time HEW
promulgated the regulations, stated that handicapped persons often
require different treatment in order to be afforded equal access to
programs receiving federal financial assistance because identical
treatment often results in discrimination.°
Handicap students' advocate groups such as Higher Education
and the Handicapped ("HEATH") have agreed that identical treat-
ment of handicapped and non-handicapped students often results
in discrimination.61 HEATH emphasizes that the use of traditional
exam formats, such as multiple choice, often merely serves to reflect
a learning disabled's deficiencies. 62 Experts in the field of handi-
capped students have found that although learning disabled stu-
dents have the capability to learn, their deficiencies in processing
55 See, e.g., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988)
(College of Optometry has an obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for its
students).
as 45 C.F.R. § 84.44.
57 Id. 84.44(a).
08 Id, § 84.44(c).
59 Id.
" 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (May 17, 1976) (to be codified at C.F.R. * 84).
" HEATH RESOURCE CENTER, MEASURING STUDENT PROGRESS IN THE CLASSROOM (1985--
1986).
ci Id.
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information cause them to learn differently." Further, experts have
noted that generally, a learning disabled student's processing abili-
ties are deficient only in one or a small number of areas. 64 Conse-
quently, scholars in the area of learning disabilities have found that
by allowing alternate test formats, learning disabled students are
able to show their abilities, rather than disabilities.65
Nevertheless, a concern arose among commentators regarding
the regulation requiring alternate test formats.66 This concern was
that the regulation would require schools to perform a global search
for alternate test formats that did not discriminate against handi-
capped students. 67 HEW announced that this result was not the
intent of the alternate test format requirement, and amended the
regulation so that the Director of the Office of Civil Rights, rather
than individual schools, had the burden of finding alternate test
formats. 68
In addition to requiring alternate test formats when necessary
to evaluate a handicapped student's abilities more adequately, the
regulations provide for other modifications that schools may need
to make in order to accommodate their handicapped students. For
example, a school may have to modify the length of time permitted
for the completion of a degree, substitute required courses, or adapt
the manner in which some courses are conducted. 69 The regulations
also provide, however, for the so-called "essential to the program"
exception." This exception states that where a school can show that
an academic requirement is essential to its educational program,
the requirement will not be deemed discriminatory under section
504, and the institution need not modify the requirement. 7 ' The
regulations, however, are silent as to what burden of proof falls on
" See Adler, Library Orientation: Intervention Strategies for Students with Learning Disabilities,
7 J. OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC. & DISABILITY 45, 46-47 (1989).
64 See Sears, supra note I, at 65.
65 See, e.g., L. SMITH, THE COLLEGE STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY: A FACULTY HANDBOOK
12 (1982).
" 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A (29) (1989).
67 Id.
" Id.
69 Id. 84.44(a). Some educators are concerned about the possibility of students de-
manding alternate forms of instruction. Telephone interview with Karen Muncaster, Director
of Learning Disabilities Office, Middlesex Community College (Sept. 20, 1990). Although
the regulations expressly provide for changes in the way courses are conducted, some
educators have questioned whether HEW has the power to force professors to change their
methods of instruction. Karen Muncaster, supra.
7° 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a).
71 Id.
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the school in showing that a requirement is essential. 72 Thus, al-
though schools may need to mike reasonable accommodations for
their handicapped students, they do not have to make fundamental
changes in their programs under section 504.
b. Auxiliary Aids Regulation
The regulations also attempt to effectuate section 504 through
an auxiliary aids provision." Under this provision, schools must
provide their handicapped students with necessary . auxiliary aids,
such as taped texts, hearing aids and similar devices. 74 The auxiliary
aids regulation, however, does not require schools to provide more
costly personal aids such as individual attendants:"
Institutions of higher education have expressed concern re-
garding the costs of providing auxiliary aids. 76 Other than excluding
personalized services, the regulations did not originally address this
cost issue. 77 In 1980, however, HEW attempted to respond to the
concerns of universities regarding the cost of complying with ac-
commodation provisions, especially the auxiliary aids section. 78 In
,an appendix to the regulations, HEW emphasized that universities
can usually meet the auxiliary aids requirement through the use of
resources already in place such as outside rehabilitation agencies
and charitable organizations. 79 HEW noted that by using these ex-
isting resources, schools would not incur any costs for most auxiliary
aids."
HEW further emphasized in the appendix that where a school
has to pay for such devices, it has flexibility in deciding how to
supply the aids. 8 ' For example, HEW noted that universities could
use volunteer students to work with the handicapped." Other than
this general statement, however, the regulations did not discuss
whether a university could ever use excessive cost as a defense to
non-compliance with section 504. 83
72 See id.
" See id. § 84.44(d).
74 Id.
75 Id. § 84.44(d)(2).
76 Id. App. A (31).
77 See id. $ 84.44(d)(2).
78 See id. App. A (31).
79 Id.
8° Id.
ei Id.
" Id.
" Id.
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Thus, one commentator has noted that section 504 and its
regulations impose a duty on schools to provide potentially expen-
sive accommodations. 84 Nonetheless, a provision of the Rehabilita-
tion Act pertaining to employment discrimination, allows courts to
consider cost when determining what types of reasonable accom-
modations employers must provide for their handicapped employ-
ees. 85
 Thus, this commentator has argued that this provision should
apply to schools because the cost of providing accommodations to
handicapped students could become a severe financial burden on
schools. 86
Nevertheless, another commentator has suggested that schools'
cost analysis should be different from employers' cost analysis be-
cause schools incur a lower cost risk in admitting handicapped
students into their programs than employers do in hiring handi-
capped employees. 87 This commentator has suggested that if a dis-
abled employee cannot master his or her work after the employer
has provided reasonable accommodations, the employer suffers di-
rect costs in lost productivity." This commentator has also noted
that if a handicapped student, after receiving accommodations, can-
not meet a school's academic requirements, only the student is
adversely affected by poor grades. 89 Thus, this commentator argues
that universities' cost analysis is likely to be narrower than the broad
cost analysis used in employment situations.9°
c. Flagging
Another concern related to HEW's regulations is the practice
of fiagging. 91 Under section 504's regulations, schools may not make
any pre-admission inquiry as to whether a candidate has a disabil-
ity. 92 Flagging, however, is a procedure whereby tests are marked
to indicate which students have received examination format mod-
ifications, and what types of accommodations they received while
" See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 888-89 (1980).
85 Id. at 900.
86 Id.
82 See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 250.
6.8 Id.
89 Id.
98 Id.
91
 Id. at 237.
92
 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(b)(4) (1989).
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taking these tests." HEW did not mention the practice of flagging
in its regulations.
Commentators have noted that flagging is most often found in
the admissions process, because the Department of Education allows
the standardized testing services that are used in the college/uni-
versity admissions process to report to schools any special modifi-
cations that a test-taker received." Consequently, commentators
have noted that, with flagging, schools may indirectly discover stu-
dents' disabilities during the pre-admission process." The HEW
regulation is designed to avoid this result."
In sum, section 504's regulations serve to define the terms
contained within the section. In doing so, these regulations reiterate
Congress's announcement that the section's purpose is to provide
handicapped students with equal access to colleges and universities
that receive federal financial assistance.97 For example, the HEW
regulations state that schools must provide an integrated setting for
handicapped students to help ensure equal opportunities for hand-
icapped students."
Furthermore, the regulations require schools to provide their
handicapped students with reasonable academic accommodations."
Such accommodations include providing handicapped students with
alternate test formats, additional time to complete their degrees and
necessary auxiliary aids.'°° The regulations, however, explicitly limit
this reasonable modifications requirement with the so-called "essen-
tial to the program" exception. 1°' Consequently, under the regula-
tions, where a school can prove that its requirement is essential to
the academic program, the school does not have to modify the
requirement to accommodate a handicapped student.'° 2
Moreover, the legislative and regulatory histories of section 504
emphasize that it is a civil rights act for the handicapped.'°3 As such,
g' Rothstein, supra note 7, at 237.
" Id. at 245, 253.
r Id.
96 Id.
97 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of HEW's regulations.
so See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 84.4(b)(2) (1989).
99 See supra notes 58-62, 71-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable
accommodations required under HEW's regulations.
100 Id.
101 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a).
107 See id.
' 05 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative and
regulatory history announcing that section 504 is a broad civil rights act.
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the legislative and regulatory history indicates that a major goal of
section 504 and its regulations is to provide equal opportunities to
handicapped students in their pursuit of higher education.ic" Thus,
the HEW regulations mandate that schools must, when necessary,
provide reasonable accommodations that ensure handicapped stu-
dents the equal opportunity to attain their educational goals.'° 5
IL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 504
Commentators have noted that courts interpreting section 504
have clarified some of the questions regarding the procedural and
substantive issues that its legislative history and regulations left
unanswered.m The basic procedural issue that courts have faced is
whether a handicapped student has a private cause of action under
section 504.t 07 Courts have established that handicapped students
do not have a private right of action against the Secretary of Edu-
cation under section 504. 108 The courts have, however, upheld a
private cause of action against universities.m Thus, handicapped
students may sue the universities that they attend for violations of
section 504. 110
n" See supra notes 35, 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal oppor-
tunity purpose of section 504.
155 95 C.F.R. § 89.94(a).
" See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 230.
'" See Salvador v. Bell, 622 F. Supp. 438, 440-42 (N.D. III. 1985); Barnes v. Converse
College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D. S.C. 1977).
'D" Salvador, 622 F. Supp. at 442. The plaintiff, Salvador, a learning disabled student,
had enrolled in defendant school's master degree program. Id. at 439. Salvador claimed that
the school failed to modify its academic program for him in violation of section 504. Thus,
Salvador sued the Secretary of the Department of Education, alleging that the Secretary had
failed to investigate his complaints that the university had discriminated against him in
violation of section 504. The district court reasoned that because title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("title VI") did not recognize a right to a private cause of action against the
Secretary, and because section 504 was modeled after title VI, a private cause of action did
not exist under section 504. Id. at 441.
105
 Barnes, 436 F. Supp. at 638. In Barnes, the defendant, Converse College, admitted
Barnes, a deaf student, to its graduate summer school program. Id. at 636. Because Converse
College refused to provide Barnes with an interpreter, a necessary auxiliary aid, she sued
the university for noncompliance with section 504. In ruling that section 504 allowed this
student a private cause of action, the court reasoned that the relative judicial ease in imple-
menting the right, the assurance of administrative due process, and the administrative
consistency that the right would provide was in accordance with the legislative intent of
providing equal opportunity to handicapped students. Id. at 638. Thus, the Barnes court
concluded that a private cause of action exists under section 504. Id.
110 id,
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In the substantive areas of section 504, courts have examined
the definition of "otherwise qualified."'" This definition has evolved
over a number of cases." 2 Furthermore, the courts' interpretation
of "otherwise qualified" has led to an examination of what types of
academic accommodations schools must provide for their handi-
capped students under section 504." 3
Other substantive issues of section 504 have concerned the
extent to which section 504 mandates schools to provide their hand-
icapped students with reasonable academic accommodations." 4 In
determining these accommodations, courts have addressed such
issues as whether a school must have documentation of a handi-
capped student's disability before section 504 requires it to provide
reasonable accommodations, and whether a school can use excessive
cost as a valid defense to not providing reasonable accommoda-
tions. 115 The reasonable accommodation analyses of the courts have
also examined the role that the doctrine of academic deference
plays in section 504 litigation." 6 Specifically, courts have had to
determine the extent to which they should defer to a school's de-
cision that an academic accommodation is not reasonable because it
would modify an essential requirement of the school's program." 7
A. The Evolution of the "Otherwise Qualified" Standard
1. Early Definition of "Otherwise Qualified": Southeastern
Community College v. Davis
To establish a claim against a university under section 504, a
person must prove that he or she: is handicapped under section
See infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial inter-
pretation of "otherwise qualified."
112 Compare Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("oth-
erwise qualified" handicapped students are those able to meet all of a program's requirements
despite their handicap) with Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575
(6th Cir. 1988) ("otherwise qualified" analysis involves a consideration of reasonable accom-
modations) and Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) (in
"otherwise qualified" analysis, the ultimate question is whether reasonable accommodations
exist).
"5 See infra notes 135-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' reasonable
accommodations analyses.
114 Id.
"5 See infra notes 148-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of knowledge and
cost issues arising under section 504.
" 5 Sec infra notes 196-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of the academic
deference doctrine.
" 2 See infra notes 196-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of different courts'
treatment of the academic deference doctrine in section 504 litigation.
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504; is otherwise qualified to complete the school's program; was
excluded from the school's program solely because of the handicap;
and that the school receives federal financial aid." 8
 Under the
substantive development of section 504 case law involving higher
education, one area that courts have addressed is what satisfies the
"otherwise qualified" requirement of section 504."g
The first case to define "otherwise qualified" was the 1979 case
of Southeastern Community College v. Davis, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that an "otherwise qualified" handicapped
person is one who is capable of meeting all of a program's require-
ments despite his or her handicap. 120 In Davis, the defendant,
Southeastern Community College ("Southeastern"), denied the
plaintiff, a deaf student, admission to its nursing program. 12 ' The
Court reasoned that the student was not "otherwise qualified" under
section 504 because the ability to understand spoken words was
necessary for the clinical part of the program. 122 Thus, the Court
established that where a student cannot meet a necessary require-
ment of a school's program, that student is not "otherwise qualified"
for section 504 purposes.' 23
In Davis, the student suffered from a severe hearing disor-
Although the use of a hearing aid greatly increased the
student's ability to hear sounds, she still depended heavily on her
lip-reading ability to understand others. 125 The school, Southeast-
ern, concluded that the student's disability made it unsafe for her
to participate in the clinical training program. Thus, Southeastern
denied her admission to its nursing program.' 26
Upon reviewing the plaintiff's section 504 claim in Davis, the
Court agreed with Southeastern's determination that the student
was not qualified for the nursing program because her disability
made her participation in the program unsafe. 127 In making this
determination, the Court defined an "otherwise qualified" person
as one who is able to meet all of a program's academic requirements
"8 See Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988).
"s See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1979).
1" Id. at 405-06.
" I Id. at 401-02.
122 Id. at 406-07.
I" Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
124 Id. at 400.
125 Id. at 401.
l" Id. at 401-02.
/d. at 414.
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despite his or her handicap. 128 Thus, because the student was unable
to meet satisfactorily the nursing program's requirements, the Davis
Court held that she was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504,
and consequently, she had no discrimination claim against the
schoo1. 129
In its decision, the Davis Court did not examine what may
constitute reasonable accommodations under section 504.'" The
Court did, however, examine whether the school's requirements
that Davis could not meet were necessary for participation in the
program."' Although the Court did determine that Southeastern's
requirements were essential to its nursing program, it reasoned that
if the requirements had not been essential, and if reasonable mod-
ifications would have enabled Davis to complete the program suc-
cessfully, the school's refusal to make reasonable modifications
would have violated section 504."2 Furthermore, the Davis Court
noted that situations might arise in which insistence on a particular
program requirement might discriminate against a handicapped
student in violation of section 504, and that the identification of
those instances was an important responsibility of HEW.'" In Dav-
is's case, however, the modifications that she needed would have
fundamentally altered the program, and consequently, were more
extreme than the type of modifications required under the regu-
lations. Thus, the Court reasoned that Davis was not "otherwise
qualified." 134
2. Determining "Otherwise Qualified" in Terms of Reasonable
Accommodations: Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry
Following Davis, courts began to recognize that a determination
of whether a handicapped student is "otherwise qualified" neces-
sarily involves an inquiry into reasonable accommodations.'" For
example, in the 1988 case of Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
an "otherwise qualified" handicapped .person is one who, with the
128 Id. at 406.
' 29 Id. at 414.
114 See id. at 407-10.
121 Id. at 407.
22 See id. at 409-10.
122 Id. at 412-13.
124 Id. at 414.
"2 See, e.g., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir.
1988).
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aid of reasonable modifications by the school, meets the required
standards of the school's program.' 36 The Sixth Circuit announced
that it could no longer literally accept the Davis interpretation of
"otherwise qualified" that a handicapped student must be able to
meet all of a school's requirements despite the handicap.'s 7 The
Doherty court reasoned that under Davis, only those who could fulfill
a program's requirements without any reasonable accommodations
were "otherwise qualified," and concluded that this outcome was
paradoxical.'" Thus, the Doherty court established that in determin-
ing whether a student is "otherwise qualified" for section 504 pur-
poses, a court must examine whether reasonable accommodations
exist that would enable the student to meet a program's require-
ments.'"
In Doherty, the plaintiff, an optometry student, had a neurolog-
ical condition that impaired his motor skills and manual coordina-
tion.R° During Doherty's first year at optometry school, the school
established a new requirement: a clinical proficiency test in which
students had to perform techniques with certain optometric instru-
ments. Because of his disability, Doherty could not pass the profi-
ciency exam. As a result, the school refused to confer a degree upon
Doherty.' 4 '
In concluding that it could not take the Davis interpretation of
"otherwise qualified" literally, the Doherty court reasoned that if the
term "otherwise qualified" included only those handicapped stu-
dents who could satisfy all of a program's requirements despite
their handicaps, the term referred only to those students already
capable of satisfying all of the program's requirements. 142 But, if
the term "otherwise qualified" included only those who were already
capable of meeting a program's requirements, the Doherty court
reasoned, schools would never have to modify their requirements
because a student would have to be able to meet the requirement
without modification in order to be "otherwise qualified." 14s Thus,
the Doherty court concluded that the Davis interpretation created a
paradox and could not be taken literally. '44
' 36 See id.
117
 Id. at 575.
118 Id.
1" See id.
1'0 Id. at 572.
14/
 Id. at 573.
142
 Id. at 574-75.
141 See id. at 575.
L44 Id.
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The Doherty court responded to this paradox by adopting a
balancing approach in determining whether a handicapped student
is "otherwise qualified" under section 504.'" Under this balancing
approach, a court must ask whether any reasonable accommoda-
tions exist that could satisfy the interests of the school and the
handicapped student by enabling the student to perform the re-
quirements. Thus, the Doherty court established that under section
504, an "otherwise qualified" handicapped student is one who, with
the provision of reasonable accommodations by the school, can
satisfy the school's academic requirements. 146
B. Reasonable Accommodations
1. The Status of Knowledge of Students' Disabilities as a
Prerequisite to Providing Reasonable Accommodations
Another substantive issue of section 504 relates to the extent
of a school's obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to
"otherwise qualified" handicapped students.' 47 Specifically, there is
concern about whether a university must have knowledge of a stu-
dent's learning disability before it must provide the modifications
that section 504 mandates.'" Although the issue has arisen in a few
cases, courts have not conclusively decided it.
The knowledge issue was present in the 1985 case of Salvador
v. Bell, in which the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that a student did not have a section 504
claim against the Secretary of Education."" In Salvador, a learning
disabled student claimed that the school he was attending for a
master's degree had failed to modify its academic program for him
in violation of section 504. 150 Thus, Salvador sued the Secretary of
the Department of Education, alleging that the Secretary had failed
to investigate his complaints that the university had discriminated
against him in violation of section 504.
The Salvador court indicated that the school had no knowledge
of Salvador's disability. The court did not, however, specifically
"5 See id.
116
"7 Salvador v. Bell, 622 F. Supp. 438, 439 (N.D. III. 1985).
149 Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); Salvador, 622 F. Supp. at 439.
19 622 F. Supp. at 439. See supra note 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the issue on which the case was decided.
150
 622 F. Supp. at 439.
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determine whether a school must know of a student's handicap
before a court can hold it in violation of section 504 because it
procedurally dismissed the case. 15 ' Nonetheless, although not de-
ciding whether •knowledge is required in judicial proceedings, the
Salvador opinion acknowledged that the Office of Civil Rights had
concluded that a school only incurs an obligation to provide rea-
sonable accommodations when it is aware of a student's disability. 152
Consequently, .according to the Salvador court, where a student
pursues an administrative course of action against a school, the
student must show that the school did know of the disability.'"
More recently, in 1988, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in Aloia v. New York Law School,
examined in dicta whether a school's knowledge of a student's dis-
ability is a prerequisite to a section 504 claim when it held that a
student was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504.' 54 In Aloia,
a law student claimed that New York Law School had discriminated
against him in violation of section 504 solely because of his neuro-
logical disability.' 55
 In determining whether the school had discrim-
inated against Aloia solely because of his handicap, the district court
found the issue of the school's knowledge of the disability deter-
minative.' 56 The court reasoned that, unless the school had known
of the student's disability, it could not have discriminated against
the student solely because of the handicap.' 57 The court, however,
refused to rule on whether the school actually had knowledge of
the student's disability. 158
In Aloia, the plaintiff's grade point average ("GPA") had fallen
below the school's required minimum of 2.0 during his third year
of law school.' 59 As a result, the school's academic status committee
met to discuss his academic difficulties. In his report to the academic
status committee, Aloia did not mention that he had a disability.' 60
' 51 Id. at 442-43. See supra note 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
procedural issue on which the court decided the case.
152
 622 F. Supp. at 439.
See id.
	
•
158
 No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988).
See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue on which the
court ultimately decided the case.
' 55 No. 88 Civ. 3184,1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *14.
155 See id. at 17-20.
157
	 at 17-18.
158 Id. at 20-21.
159
	 at 3.
1" Id. at 4-5.
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After the meeting, the academic status committee voted to dismiss
Aloia from the law school for his inability to maintain the school's
academic standards.' 6 ' After his dismissal, Aloia presented the ac-
ademic status committee chairperson with a doctor's letter certifying
that Aloia suffered from a central nervous system disorder that had
adversely affected his performance in law school.' 62
Upon its review, the Aloia court reasoned that if the school had
no knowledge of Aloia's disability, the school could not have ex-
cluded him solely on the basis of his handicap.' 63 The Aloia court
did not, however, decide whether Aloia's claim had survived sum-
mary judgment on the knowledge issue because it granted summary
judgment on another issue.'" Thus, although suggesting that a
school must have knowledge of a handicapped student's disability
before it can be held in violation of section 504, the Aloia court did
not decide whether mere manifestations of a handicapped student's
disabling symptoms could put a school on notice of a student's
disability. 165
2. Schools' Use of Financial Needs Tests to Avoid the Costs of
Providing Accommodations
Case law has also developed regarding the cost concerns of
schools with respect to section 504 compliance.' 66 Specifically, many
schools are concerned about the large potential expenses that they
can incur in providing reasonable accommodations such as auxiliary
aids.' 67 Consequently, courts have had to determine to what extent
a university can use cost as a valid defense against not complying
with section 504's reasonable accommodation requirement.' 69 Dur-
ing the passage of the 1978 amendments, Congress adopted an
amendment allowing courts to take cost into account when deter-
mining the reasonable accommodations that employers must pro-
vide to disabled employees. 169 Although the amendment applies
Id. at 5.
110 Id. at 6.
163 See id. at 17-18.
16' See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the issue on which
the court decided Aloia.
165 No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *18-20.
158 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740, 742
(11th Cir, 1990); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
167 See, e.g,, 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A (31) (1989).
See, e.g., Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d at 742.
mg 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1988).
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only to discrimination against employees and not students, com-
mentators have argued that this legislative concern over cost of
compliance indicates that courts should apply a similar cost analysis
to section 504 claims.'"
A few courts have discussed the cost analysis issue."' Specifi-
cally, courts have considered the validity of universities' "financial
needs" tests.'" Under these tests, a handicapped student must show
financial inability to pay for the necessary auxiliary aids before the
universities will pay for any such aids.' 73
For example, in 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in University of Texas v. Camenisch, considered
whether a university had to pay for a student's necessary auxiliary
aid even though the student did not meet the university's "financial
needs" test, and held that the defendant had to provide the hand-
icapped student with an interpreter."4 In support of its holding,
the Camenisch court reasoned that a HEW regulation requires col-
leges and universities to provide auxiliary aids in order to accom-
modate handicapped students.'" Thus, the Camenisch court estab-
lished that because a HEW regulation mandates the provision of
auxiliary aids, universities must pay for the necessary auxiliary aids
of handicapped students regardless of the students' financial situ-
ation.'"
In Camenisch, the defendant university had established a "fi-
nancial needs" test, whereby a handicapped student had to meet
the university's established criteria for financial assistance before
the school would provide him or her with any auxiliary aids. 17
Camenisch was a deaf graduate student at the university. Although
he needed an interpreter to complete his master's degree, the uni-
versity failed to provide him with one. The university based its
decision not to pay for Camenisch's interpreter on the ground that
he failed to meet the school's "financial needs" test. 178
In determining that the school had to provide interpreters to
deaf students such as Camenisch, the Camenisch court noted that
170 See Note, supra note 84, at 900.
1 " See, e.g., Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 12.2d at 746-48.
12
 See, e.g., Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala.. 908 F.2d at 742; University of Texas V.
Carnenisch, 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1980).
"3 See Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d at 742.
"4 See 616 F.2d at 129,
'" Id. at 133.
"b Id. at 129, 133.
'" Id. at 129.
178 Id.
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the HEW regulations do not require schools to provide extensive
"individual attention" services to handicapped students.' 7• Because
the HEW regulations specifically mention interpreters under the
auxiliary aids section, however, the court reasoned that a sign lan-
guage interpreter fell within the category of services that schools
must provide for their handicapped students. Thus, the Camenisch
court held that the defendant university had to py for Camenisch's•
sign language interpreter, thereby establishing that, under section
504, universities must provide auxiliary aids to their handicapped
students regardless of the students' financial needs.' 8°
A subsequent case also struck down the validity of a university's
use of "financial needs" tests in determining whether to provide a
handicapped student with auxiliary aids."B 1 In 1990, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v.
Board of Trustees for the University of Alabama, held that a university
could not impose a "financial needs" test as a means of precluding
the provision of auxiliary aids to handicapped students.'82 In Board
of Trustees, the United States brought an action against the Univer-
sity of Alabama for refusing to comply with HEW's regulation
prohibiting the use of "financial needs" tests in determining whether
a handicapped student or the university must pay for auxiliary
aids.' 83 In support of its holding, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the Department of Education's prohibition of "financial needs" tests
was entitled to conclusive weight because the department's position
on the meaning of the regulation pertaining to auxiliary aids was
consistent with the language of the regulation itself.'" Thus, the
Board of Trustees court established that a university must provide its
handicapped students with auxiliary aids regardless of financial
need.'85
In Board of Trustees, the University of Alabama had developed
an auxiliary aids policy under which it provided aids, such as tran-
scriptions of class lectures and note-takers, to handicapped stu-
dents. 186 The university, however, only provided handicapped stu-
I" Id. at 133.
See id. at 129.
'"' See United States v. Board of Trustees for the Univ. of Ala., 908 F,2d 740, 732'(11th
Cir. 1990).
L82 See id.
'"' See id. at 742-43.
1 " Id. at 746, 749.
in Board of Trustees for the Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d at 752,
188 Id. at 742.
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dents with more costly aids, such as interpreters, in limited
circumstances. Before providing interpreters, the university first
required a handicapped student to seek free interpreter services
from the state Vocational Rehabilitation Service. If the student
could not procure an interpreter through this service, the university
then required that the student demonstrate that he or she could
not pay for an interpreter before the school provided one.' 87
In striking down the university's "financial needs" test, the
Board of Trustees court relied on the HEW regulation that mandates
that schools provide auxiliary aids.'" Based on the language of this
provision, the court concluded that section 504 requires universities
to provide auxiliary aids to their handicapped students regardless
of the students' financial need.' 89 Furthermore, the court empha-
sized that schools will not, for the most part, incur excessive expense
in providing aids to handicapped students because they can use
existing resources, such as outside rehabilitation agencies and vol-
unteer students, to provide the aids.'" In addition, the court rea-
soned that because the cost of providing auxiliary aids would not
impose a severe financial burden on the university, the provision of
the aids constituted a reasonable accommodation under section
504. 19 ' Thus, while recognizing universities' valid cost concerns over
providing aids, the Eleventh Circuit, in Board of Trustees, established
that where outside rehabilitation agencies cannot provide such aids,
schools must, under section 504, provide necessary auxiliary aids to
their handicapped students.' 92
Thus, the case law has established that universities cannot use
"financial needs" tests to avoid complying with the HEW regulation
requiring schools to provide necessary auxiliary aids to their hand-
icapped students.' 93 Moreover, although recognizing schools' con-
cerns over the cost of providing auxiliary aids, courts have con-
cluded that because the provision of these aids would generally not
impose an undue financial strain on schools, the HEW regulation
constitutes a reasonable accommodation under section 504. 194 Thus,
commentators have noted that the reasoning of cases like Camenisch
1" Id.
188
 Id, at 744.
In
 Id. at 752.
19° Id, at 745.
" I Id. at 748.
in Id. at 749 n.5, 752.
195 Id. at 752.
um E.g., id. at 748.
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and Board of Trustees for University of Alabama implies that a school
would have to prove that the provision of auxiliary aids would make
a program economically non-viable before it could assert the finan-
cial burden defense) 95
3. The Role of Academic Deference in Determining Reasonable
Accommodations
Another substantive issue that courts have addressed under
section 504 is the determination of whether an accommodation for
a learning disabled student is reasonable or would fundamentally
alter a school's program. 198 Under the HEW regulations, schools
must make reasonable modifications to their program requirements
for their handicapped students unless the schools can prove that
their program requirement is essential to their program) 97 Courts
have noted that the rationale behind this regulation is that schools
should not have to alter or lower their academic standards substan-
tially in complying with section 504) 98 The regulations, however,
do not provide for any standards regarding the school's burden of
proof in using the "essential to the program" defense in noncom-
pliance with section 504) 99
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the judiciary
has afforded academic decisions of institutions of higher education
substantial deference. 20° The Court has also noted that this defer-
ence is based on the Court's commitment to protecting academic
19 See Note, supra note 84, at 903.
199 See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991); Doherty
v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988).
197 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1989).
106 See, e.g., Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7769 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); Doherty, 862 F.2d at 574.
199 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a).
"Cr
 Regents of Univ. of Mich, v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). In reversing the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's holding in favor of Ewing, the Supreme
Court deferred to the school's academic decision to dismiss Ewing from its six-year joint
undergraduate and medical degree program based on his failure of a required examination
and general poor academic performance. Id. at 215, 227-28. The Court reasoned that courts
should respect a faculty's academic decisions because a federal court is not suited to evaluate
the substance of purely academic decisions. Id. at 226. Rather than a section 504 claim, Ewing
based his claim on the allegation that because he had a property interest in his enrollment
in the program, the school's arbitrary decision to dismiss him violated his substantive due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 217. The Court determined that in
reviewing this case under a substantive due process standard, it would show great deference
to the school's academic decisions. Id. at 225. Thus, the Court held that a court may not
override a school's purely academic decision unless it is a substantial departure from academic
norms. Id.
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freedorn.20 ' In academic freedom cases, the Supreme Court has
reasoned that there is a first amendment right of academic institu-
tions to decide what they will teach, how they will teach and who
they will admit into their academic programs.202 Furthermore, the
Court has recognized that the determination of substantive aca-
demic decisions requires the expert evaluation of educators, and
thus, it is not easily adaptable to judicial decision-making. 203 Al-
though the academic freedom cases are not specifically related to
section 504 claims, courts have noted that the issue of academic
deference is relevant in such litigation because courts must decide
whether the doctrine precludes them from questioning the validity
of a school's decision that an academic requirement is essential to
its program and thus, that the school does not have to modify it to
accommodate the handicapped student. 2°4
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld the doctrine of deferring to the academic judgment
of university faculties in Anderson v. University of Wisconsin. 205 In
Anderson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that the University of Wisconsin Law School's decision not to read-
mit a handicapped law student did not violate section 504. 2°6 In
Anderson, the law school had based its refusal to readmit Anderson
on his failure to maintain an average grade above the school's
201 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967). In this case, the United States Supreme Court, in reversing a lower court decision,
held that a New York State plan that required faculty to sign certificates that they were not
communists and that also required removal of faculty members who lecture about "seditious"
acts was unconstitutional. Id. at 592, 604. In Keyishian, the Court announced the importance
of safeguarding academic freedom. Id. at 603. The Court reasoned that it is essential to the
development of our nation that students and teachers be free to inquire fully into and study
the many different principles of the social sciences. Thus, the Keyishian Court established
that academic freedom is a special concern of the first amendment, and that regulations that
violate that freedom are unconstitutional. Id. at 603-04.
29 ' See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting a statement made by South African scholars). In this academic freedom case, the
Supreme Court reversed the New Hampshire Supreme Court's affirmation of a college
professor's contempt conviction for refusal to answer questions by the New Hampshire
attorney general regarding the substance of the professor's lectures and his political party
affiliations. Id. at 238-45, 255. The Court reasoned that academic freedom is necessary for
the advancement and development of knowledge. Id. at 250. Thus, the Court held that the
professor's contempt conviction, which violated the doctrine of academic freedom, was un-
constitutional. Id. at 255.
20, See Ewing, 475 U.S. at 226.
204 See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991).
2°s See 841 F.2d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1988).
206 See id. at 740, 742. Anderson was an alcoholic—a handicap under section 504. Id. at
740.
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required minimum of 77. 207 The Anderson court did not examine
whether reasonable modifications would have,helped to increase
Anderson's average up to at least the required minimum. Rather,
the court reasoned that the law school could set standards for
itself. 208
 Specifically, the court noted that a school may determine
through its academic standards whether a student qualifies for its
program, and jurors are not in a position to make such academic
decisions more accurately than the university faculty. 209 Conse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's reason-
ing that Anderson's failure to maintain the school's minimum aca-
demic standards was sufficient proof that he was not "otherwise
qualified" under section 504. 210
In 1988, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York also adhered to the doctrine of academic
deference when it held, in Aloia v. New York Law School, that a student
was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504.2 " The Aloia court
reasoned that because Aloia could not maintain the school's reason-
able academic standards, he was not "otherwise qualified" within
the meaning of section 504. 212 As in Anderson, the Aloia court did
not examine whether reasonable accommodations would have en-
abled Aloia to maintain a grade point average above 2.0. Rather,
the Aloia court deferred to the school's judgment regarding its
academic standards. Consequently, the Aloia court established that
courts will afford schools substantial deference with respect to ac-
ademic standards, such as admittance requirements and minimum
grades. 2 i 8
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit also acknowledged the importance of the academic defer-
ence doctrine in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry . 214
 The Doh-
erty court held that a school's proficiency requirement that tested a
student's use of optometry instruments was essential to its academic
program and thus, that the school did not have to modify the
252
 Id. at 739-40.
205 Id. at 741.
252 Id.
210 See id. at 740.
211 See Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988). See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the facts of the case.
212 Atria, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 3988).
215 Id.
862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the facts surrounding this case.
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requirement.m The court reasoned that because optometrists are
using these instruments more frequently, proficiency in their use is
essential to the safe practice of optometry. 216 Consequently, the
Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court's dismissal of Doherty's
section 504 claim, held that the school's course requirement was
reasonably necessary to the degree sought, and thus, elimination of
the proficiency requirement would not be a reasonable accommo-
dation under section 504.2 ' 7
Nevertheless, the Doherty court, although noting in general the
importance of academic deference and ultimately deciding in the
school's favor, did not just defer to the school's decision regarding
the reasonableness of the school's standards. 2 's Rather, the court
stressed the need to use a balancing test, taking into account the
legitimate interests of both the school and the handicapped student
to determine whether reasonable accommodations exist. 219 Thus,
the Sixth Circuit balanced the school's interests, such as the use of
the instruments by optometrists, and the need for patient safety,
with the student's interest in practicing as an optometrist. 220 The
court reasoned that because the use of such devices is becoming
more common among optometrists and proper use is essential to
patients' safety, the school's requirement was reasonably necessary,
and consequently outweighed the student's interests. Thus, the Doh-
erty court established that courts will not necessarily defer to a
school's academic decisions in deciding section 504 claims. 22 '
In 1981, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, in Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado, also
refused to defer to a school's academic decision to deny admission
to a handicapped student. 222 In Pushkin, the defendant medical
school denied the plaintiff, a medical doctor, admission to its psy-
chiatric residency program. 223 Because he had multiple sclerosis, a
condition that confined him to a wheelchair and disabled his motor
coordination skills, the Pushkin court reasoned that Pushkin was
handicapped under section 504. 224
215 862 F.2d at 574-75.
216 Doherty, 862 F.2d at 574.
2 17
 Id, at 575.
"a Id. at 575-76.
212 Id. at 575.
220 Id. at 574-75.
221
 Id. at 575.
222 504 F. Stipp. 1292, 1299 (D. Colo. 1981).
225
 Id. at 1293.
224 Id.
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Instead of deferring to the faculty's decision not to admit Push-
kin based on their determination that he was not "otherwise quali-
fied," the court reasoned that Pushkin was "otherwise qualified"
because he could complete the program with reasonable accom-
modation by the schoo1. 223 The Pushkin court also reasoned that the
modifications in the residency program that Pushkin needed, such
as a part-time course load, modified curriculum schedule, and re-
duced night call duty, were reasonable and that they would not
substantially alter the integrity of the school's program. Moreover,
the court noted that the school had made the adjustments Pushkin
needed for other handicapped students in the past, and thus, the
school's past practices further indicated that the accommodations
were reasonable. Thus, by refusing to follow the academic defer-
ence doctrine, the Pushkin court established that where the provision
of reasonable accommodations will enable a handicapped student
to Meet the requirements of a program, that student is "otherwise
qualified" under section 504. 226
Following Pushkin, in the 1991 case of Wynne v. Tufts University
School of Medicine, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit also refused to adhere strictly to the doctrine of academic
deference. 227 In Wynne, the court held that a factual dispute re-
mained concerning whether a dyslexic medical student was "oth-
erwise qualified" for medical school under section 504 even though
the defendant medical school had made an academic decision that
the student was not qualified for its program of study. 228 In support
of its holding, the Wynne court reasoned that section 504 requires
courts to examine a school's academic decisions to determine if they
amount to discrimination. 229
 Thus, the Wynne court established that
a court must not merely defer to a school's academic decisions in
section 504 claims.230
Wynne, a medical student with dyslexia, claimed that Tufts
Medical School had violated section 504 when it refused to modify
its testing methods to accommodate his learning disability."' In
Wynne's first year of medical school, he failed eight of fifteen
'" Id. at 1295.
228 See id. at 1295, 1299.
227 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19,25-26 (1st Cir. 1991).
2" Id. at 27-28.
2" Id. at 26.
2]e
	 at 25-26.
231
 Id. at 22.
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courses. 232
 Tufts allowed him to retake the eight failed classes under
a specialized study program that the school had designed. 233 This
program provided Wynne with academic tutors and note-takers for
the classes he was retaking. The school, however, refused to substi-
tute its multiple choice tests with the oral ones that Wynne had
requested. 234
 Under the special study program, Wynne still failed
two courses: 235
 Tufts allowed Wynne to retake the two examinations,
but Wynne still failed one of the exams. Upon the last failure, Tufts
expelled Wynne from the Medical School.
Wynne based his section 504 claim on Tufts' failure to provide
him with an alternate test format in place of the existing multiple
choice format. 256
 Wynne alleged that, in light of his learning dis-
ability, such an accommodation was reasonable and that the school's
refusal to provide the alternate test format for him amounted to
discrimination under section 504. Conversely, Tufts maintained that
its multiple choice tests were substantive in nature because they
measured a student's ability to absorb, interpret and analyze com-
plex data."' Furthermore, Tufts argued, these abilities are neces-
sary for a practicing doctor, and thus, multiple choice exams were
essential to Tufts' medical school program. 238 Requiring the modi-
fication of such an essential test format, Tufts insisted, is beyond
the requirements of section 504. 239
 Tufts therefore argued that,
under the HEW regulations allowing the "essential to the program"
exception, it did not have to modify this essential requirement. 24°
Moreover, Tufts contended that under the doctrine of academic
deference, the First Circuit should defer to Tufts' purely academic
determination that the multiple choice test format was substantive
and essential to its program. 24 '
The First Circuit rejected Tufts' argument for absolute defer-
ence to its academic decision that multiple choice tests were essential
to its program. 242 The First Circuit, although recognizing the prin-
ciple of academic deference, stated that section 504 requires a court
254
	 at 21.
" 3 Id.
234 Id. at 22.
255
	 at 21.
2" Id. at 22.
2" Id. at 27.
2S5
2" Brief for Appellee at 14, Wynne, 932 F.2d at 19.
240 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 27.
2" Brief for Appellee at 21.
442 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 25.
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to scrutinize academic decisions to ensure that they do not amount
to discrimination against the handicapped, intentionally or uninten-
tionally:243 Moreover, the court reasoned that a trial court could
find that the multiple choice test format was not essential to the
school's program, and that alternate test formats that would make
Wynne "otherwise qualified" were reasonable accommodations
mandated by section 504. 244
Consequently, because Tufts failed to prove that multiple
choice examinations were essential to its medical school program,
the First Circuit overturned the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Tufts. 245 The First Circuit held in Wynne that
because a dispute still existed over whether Tufts could make ac-
commodations for Wynne that would allow him to satisfy the
school's academic requirements, a question of fact remained as to
whether Wynne was "otherwise qualified" under section 504. 246
Thus, although the Wynne court did not determine whether Wynne
was "otherwise qualified," it did establish that some courts refuse to
apply literally the academic deference doctrine. 247
In sum, the definition of "otherwise qualified" has evolved to
refer to a handicapped student who, with the aid of reasonable
accommodations, can meet the academic requirements of a school's
program. 248 Furthermore, in determining what constitutes reason-
able accommodations, courts have addressed issues regarding the
necessity of a school's knowledge of a student's disability, schools'
cost concerns regarding the provision of accommodations, and the
extent to which academic deference plays a part in a court's deter-
mination of reasonable, accommodations. 249
With respect to the knowledge issue, courts have suggested that,
to bring a section 504 suit against a university, a handicapped stu-
dent must prove that the school had known of the student's dis-
ability. 23° Courts have reasoned that otherwise, the school could not
243 Id.
2" Id. at 27.
245
 Id. at 28.
246
247 Id. at 25.
243 See supra notes 121-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development
of the definition of "otherwise qualified."
245
	 supra notes 148-247 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive
issues arising under section 504.
233
	
supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Aloia court's
discussion of knowledge issues arising under section 504.
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have excluded the student solely because of the student's handicap,
a necessary element under section 504. 251
With respect to schools' cost concerns, courts have recognized
the validity of schools' concerns over the cost of providing disabled
students with reasonable accommodations, such as auxiliary aids. 252
Courts, however, have held that colleges and universities cannot
impose "financial needs" tests to avoid providing aids to handi-
capped students.255 Courts have reasoned that because schools have
flexibility in determining how to provide auxiliary aids, they must
provide them to all of their handicapped students in need of such
aids.254 Thus, schools must provide needed auxiliary aids to their
handicapped students regardless of the students' financial needs.
In addition, courts have also addressed schools' concerns over
the judiciary's treatment of the doctrine of academic deference in
section 504 claims.255 A few courts have recognized the importance
of deferring to the academic judgments of schools and conse-
quently, have deferred to a school's determination that an academic
requirement is essential to its program, and thus, that it need not
be modified under section 504. 256 Other courts, however, while
acknowledging the doctrine of academic deference, have reasoned
that section 504 requires the judiciary to examine closely academic
requirements of schools to determine whether schools' require-
ments are discriminatory towards handicapped students and if the
requirements could reasonably be modified to prevent the discrim-
ination.257 Thus, despite the historical academic deference doctrine,
some courts have refused to defer absolutely to the academic deci-
sions of schools in section 504 claims.258
251 See supra note 166 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship of a
school's knowledge of a student's disability with respect to the third element of a section 504
claim.
"2 See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of schools' cost
concerns with respect to providing reasonable accommodations.
"3 See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the invalidity of
financial needs tests with respect to the provision of auxiliary aids.
254 See supra note 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the flexibility that
schools have in complying with section 504's auxiliary aids requirement.
255
	
supra notes 202-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' treatment
of the doctrine of academic deference.
255 See, e.g., Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEX1S
7769, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 741
(7th Cir. 1988).
254
	 e.g., Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1991);
Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 504 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (D. Colo. 1981).
'm See supra notes 217-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of
academic deference.
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III. ANALYSIS OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS SCHOOLS MUST
PROVIDE FOR HANDICAPPED STUDENTS
The legislative and regulatory history of section 504 demon-
strates that it is a broad civil rights act designed to ensure equal
opportunities for "otherwise qualified" handicapped students in
higher education. 259 Furthermore, the courts and HEW regulations
have established that, when necessary, schools must provide reason-
able accommodations for their handicapped students. 26° Courts,
however, have left many related issues unanswered. For example,
although courts have suggested that a school must have knowledge
of a handicapped student's disability before a school can be held in
violation of section 504, courts have not addressed what type of
knowledge is sufficient and how schools may validly obtain this
knowledge.26 ' Part A of this section will analyze the relevant case
law on these issues to determine the amount of knowledge that
courts are likely to require schools to have in section 504 claims. 262
Courts have also left unanswered the question of the extent to
which a school can use excessive cost as a defense to failing to
provide modifications, such as auxiliary aids, to handicapped stu-
dents. 2" Because this issue of cost concerns many schools, part B
of this section will examine the validity of this defense based on
legislative intent and case law. 264
 After determining the likely scope
of the excessive cost defense, part l3 will suggest when schools could
probably use such a defense.
Finally, courts have not yet reached a consensus on the role
that academic deference should play in section 504 litigation. 265 This
issue concerns learning disabled students who need modifications
of schools' academic programs in order to succeed in school, as well
as schools who do not want to lower their academic standards. After
239
 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text for a summary of the legislative and
regulatory history of section 504.
269 See supra notes 135-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of
reasonable accommodations that schools must provide under section 504,
29' See supra notes 148-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of knowledge issues
arising under section 504.
See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text for an analysis of the knowledge
issues arising under section 504.
263
 See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cost issues
under section 504.
294 See infra notes 308-33 and accompanying text for an analysis of the extent to which
schools will likely be able to use cost as a defense to noncompliance with section 504.
293
 See supra notes 199-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict
among courts with respect to the role of academic deference in section 504 litigation.
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analyzing the conflicting case law in this area, part C of this section
will propose a treatment of the academic deference doctrine that
attempts to satisfy the needs of both handicapped students and
schools. 266
A. The Necessity of Providing Schools with Full Documentation of
Students' Disabilities
As more and more learning disabled students are entering
postsecondary institutions each year, both learning disabled stu-
dents and universities are concerned with the amount and type of
knowledge that a school must liave of a student's learning disability
before the school must provide accommodations under section 504.
Learning disabilities are often misunderstood, and are sometimes
not detected at al1.267
 Even when specialists detect these disabilities,
learning disabled students have been labeled as uneducable or un-
derachievers. 268
 Only recently have specialists begun to understand
learning disabilities and recognize them as true handicaps. 268 Thus,
because more and more learning disabled students are attending
postsecondary institutions and because it appears that a school must
have knowledge of a student's handicap before it has to comply
with section 504, it is of par4mount importance that universities
receive sufficient knowledge about their students' learning disabil-
ities in order to comply fully with section 504.
As a result of the increased medical research in the area of
diagnosis and the success of programs that the EAHCA has imple-
mented in detecting learning disabled students, more learning dis-
abled students are aware of their handicaps and have sufficient
documentation of their handicaps to furnish to universities. 27°
Nonetheless, schools do not always receive comprehensive docu-
mentation of students' learning disabilities. For example, this situ-
ation can arise when the students have not yet realized that they
are learning disabled when they enroll at their universities. Also,
schools may not receive documentation from students who know
that they have learning disabilities, but validly fear that their uni-
2b
 See infra notes 334-56 for an analysis of courts' use of academic deference in section
504 claims. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text for a proposed treatment of the
academic deference doctrine in section 504 litigation.
267 See, e.g., LEARNING DISABILITIES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (LDA), TAKING THE FIRST
STEP TO SOLVE LEARNING DISABILITIES (1990).
266 See id.
269 See td; see also Sears, supra note 1, at 62.
270
	 Rothstein, supra note 7, at 236.
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versifies will misunderstand their learning disabilities and label them
as uneducable. Although courts have indicated that some knowl-
edge of a handicap is necessary, questions arise in these situations
as to the extent to which a school must be informed of a student's
disability before it can be subject to section 504 compliance."'
1. The Validity of a Knowledge Requirement
Based on the 1988 case of Aloia v. New York Law School, a school
apparently must have knowledge of a student's disability before it
can violate section 504, 272 This requirement makes sense in terms
of the third element of a section 504 claim: that the school must
have excluded the person from the program solely because of the
person's disability. 273 Without knowledge of the student's handicap,
a school cannot discriminate against the student solely because of
the student's handicap.
This knowledge requirement is not only reasonable, but it also
brings case law in line with administrative law in this area, thereby
providing consistency in section 504 claims. 274 Specifically, the Office
of Civil Rights, which has provided administrative remedies under
section 504, held as early as 1985 that a school's obligation to pro-
vide accommodations only arises when the university either knows
or is made aware of the student's handicap. 275 This consistency will
discourage students from forum shopping between judicial and
administrative proceedings based on whether the school had knowl-
edge of the student's disability. As the standard is now the same in
both forums, the results should be more consistent. Having one
standard will aid the schools in determining their obligations under
section 504 regardless of whether the action against them is admin-
istrative or judicial. Thus, schools that have knowledge of a student's
disability must comply with section 504.
2. The Unsuitability of the Manifestations of a Disability Standard
Although the Aloia court indicated that a school must know of
a student's disability before section 504 mandates compliance, it left
27 ' See Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769,
at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); see also Rothstein, supra note 7, at 236-37.
a72 See No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988).
279
	 at 16.
2" See, e.g., Salvador v. Bell, 622 F. Supp. 438, 439 (N.D. III. 1985) (in administrative
proceedings, obligation to provide accommodations arises only when university knows about
student's handicap).
279 see id.
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many other knowledge-related issues open for interpretation. Most
importantly, the Aloia decision left open the issue of what constitutes
sufficient knowledge on the part of the school. For example, the
district court in Aloia concluded that the student did not formally
disclose his disability to the schoo1. 278
 Nevertheless, the court im-
plied in dicta that because the student occasionally manifested symp-
toms of his neurological disability during class, a genuine issue of
fact might exist as to whether the school had knowledge of the
disability and, as a result, had to comply with section 504. 277 Thus,
Aloia implied that mere manifestations of a disability may be suffi-
cient to put a school on notice of a student's disability, and thereby
to compel the school to make reasonable accommodations for the
student under section 504.
Learning disabled students, however, should not regard the
Aloia court's comments on knowledge as precedential. Although the
Aloia court did not grant the defendant school's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the knowledge issue, it did not explicitly hold
that the plaintiff student survived the motion. 278
 Because the court
in Aloia granted summary judgment on another issue, it may not
have been as concerned with the merits of the knowledge issue. 279
Thus, the court's refusal to hold explicitly that the school did not
have knowledge of Aloia's disability does not establish that mere
manifestations of a disability are sufficient to hold a school to knowl-
edge of that disability.
Moreover, imputing knowledge to a school of a student's dis-
ability based on manifestations of disabling symptoms is an un-
workable standard, especially with regard to learning disabilities.
That is, the medical field has only recently begun to understand
and recognize learning disabilities.28° Thus, it would be unduly
burdensome to expect professors to diagnose a student's learning
disability based on these manifestations in class.
Furthermore, manifestations of learning disabilities are com-
plex and misunderstood. 28 ' Learning disabilities are misunderstood,
in part, because their symptoms often make the student appear
inept and unable to learn. 282
 In reality, learning disabled students
2" Id. at 5.
1" Id. at 17-20.
2" Id. at 20.
m Id. at 24.
'4° See LDA, supra note 267, at 2; see also Sears, =P12 note 1, at 62.
251 See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 235.
"' UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, ALTERNATIVES FOR TEACHING DISABLED STUDENTS ON A
COLLEGE CAMPUS ("Alternatives"), 28 (1984).
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are usually of average or above average intelligence.288 Further-
more, the perceptual deficiencies of learning disabled students usu-
ally are limited to one or just a few areas, and, thus, the deficits
generally are inconsistent with the individual's general level of func-
tioning.284 Problems occur when the learning disabled student's
deficiency happens to be in the area in which the disabled student
is predominantly evaluated. In such cases, it will appear that the
student is unable to master the work. It would be unfair to expect
faculty to distinguish correctly those students who are not perform-
ing well because of a learning disability from those who are not
qualified. As the court in Akia correctly noted, the law school faculty
"while learned in the law are lay persons in the field of medicine." 285
As lay persons in the field of learning disabilities, it is simply too
difficult for professors to diagnose a student who has a learning
disability.
In addition, it would be inconsistent with the scope of section
504 to hold that a student's manifestations of complex and misun-
derstood handicaps, such as learning disabilities, can subject schools
to section 504 compliance. One could argue that the expansive
nature of section 504 indicates that a broad view of what constitutes
knowledge of a student's disability may be consistent with the scope
of section 504. 286 The legislative history of section 504 stresses that
the scope of section 504 was meant to be expansive. 287 Thus, one
could maintain that any manifestation of a student's disability while
in school puts a school on notice of the disability and thus, fulfills
the knowledge requirement.
The broad scope that the legislative history outlines, however,
is mostly in terms of who is protected under section 504. 288
 This
legislative history indicates that Congress enacted section 504 to
ensure that no individuals would be excluded from academic pro-
grams because their handicap appeared to be too severe. 289 Thus,
the legislative history illustrates that Congress intended section 504
2" Id; see also HEATH RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 61, at 4.
284 See Sears, supra note 1, at 65.
288 Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 7769, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988).
286 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of section
504.
2" Id,
288 See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 504's
legislative history.
269
	 REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 119, reprinted in 1973 U.S. COEIE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 2076, 2079.
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to be expansive only in the sense that it applies to all types of
handicapped persons. 29°
Furthermore, although the Act is broad in that it includes all
types of handicaps within the scope of section 504, the HEW reg-
ulations demonstrate the somewhat limited scope of section 504 in
terms of the obligations that it places on universities. 2" Most im-
portantly, these regulations emphasize section 504's purpose of
equal opportunity. 292
 Thus, under section 504, schools must provide
only equal access to higher education for handicapped students.
Moreover, although the regulations mandate that schools pro-
vide reasonable accomniodations to ensure that handicapped stu-
dents receive equal access to higher education, this obligation is
limited in various sections of the HEW regulations. For example,
although a university may have to provide an alternate test format
for a disabled student, the HEW regulations have limited this ob-
ligation by providing that schools do not have to perform a "global
search" for suitable alternate test formats. 293 Instead, HEW places
this burden on the Director of the Office of Civil Rights. 294 Thus,
just as a university does not have to search extensively for alternate
test formats, it is equally unlikely that the scope of section 504
requires a school to conduct in-depth searches within the classroom
for learning disabled students.
Another limitation that the HEW regulations place on a uni-
versity's obligation to comply with section 504 is the "essential to
the program" exception. 295 Under this exception, a school does not
have to modify an academic requirement to accommodate a hand-
icapped student if the requirement is essential to a school's program
of study. 296 The judicially developed reasoning behind this excep-
tion is that schools should not have to alter fundamentally their
programs or lower their standards to comply with section 504. 297
Putting a burden on professors to diagnose learning disabled stu-
dents in their classes could substantially diminish the quality of a
school's academic program. Professors will be distracted from their
296 See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 504's
legislative history.
29 ' See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(2), 84.44(a),(d)(2) (1989).
292
 Id. § 84.4(11)(2).
293 Id. § 84 App. A, Subpart E (29).
294 Id.
295 Id. § 84.44(a).
296 Id.
292 See, e.g., Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Cir.
1988).
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teaching if they must be on the lookout for possible manifestations
of disabilities to which they will be held accountable if the student
later sues under section 504. Thus, schools could validly argue that
placing this knowledge burden on professors is beyond the scope
of section 504 because it would fundamentally alter a school's aca-
demic programs.
In sum, although the manifestation standard implied in Aloia
may be effective for students with obvious handicaps, such as phys-
ical disabilities, one cannot feasibly apply it to students with learning
disabilities. Thus, learning disabled students should inform their
university of their disabilities as soon as possible, preferably before
admission. Once informed, the school must provide these students
with reasonable accommodations under section 504. Those students
who are not aware of their disabilities when they enroll in postse-
condary education, and then suspect that they may have a learning
disability, should get tested as soon as possible. If testing reveals a
learning disability, the students should then inform their school
immediately to ensure section 504 protection.
B. The Discriminatory Nature of Flagging
Another knowledge-related issue that courts have left unan-
swered is the appropriateness of flagging in light of section 504.
Under current practices, the Department of Education allows stan-
dardized testing services to flag or mark the tests of students who
received special modifications in test formats while taking standard-
ized tests. 298 Serious questions surround the validity of flagging in
standardized admissions tests because the HEW regulations prohibit
schools from making pre-admission inquiries into an applicant's
disabilities. 2" One problem is that the procedure indirectly gives a
school knowledge of an applicant's disability prior to acceptance.
Therefore, flagging allows a school to do indirectly what it is spe-
cifically prohibited from doing.8" Nevertheless, as standardized
testing services generally are not subject to section 504 because they
do not receive federal financial assistance, they apparently can law-
fully continue to flag their tests.
Flagging may also extend to schools' course examinations and
students' records. This use of flagging has many insidious implica-
29 See Rothstein, supra nose 7, at 245.
29" 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(b)(4).
3" See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 253.
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tions. Consequently, flagging is very problematic, especially when
universities use the practice to mark course examinations and hand-
icapped students' records.
The most insidious implication of flagging course examinations
is that the schools may regard the marked tests as less valid because
the students received accommodations. For example, a professor
may grade a flagged exam lower than an unflagged exam simply
because the professor may feel that the accommodation that the
student received provided that student with a competitive edge in
taking the examination. Thus, flagging has the potential to discrim-
inate against handicapped students, which is exactly what section
504 prohibits. 30 ' Consequently, flagging within the context of a
university's course examinations and student records should be pro-
hibited because of this implicit discrimination.
Furthermore, this implication that schools should treat flagged
tests as less valid than unflagged tests conflicts with the equal op-
portunity purpose behind section 504. 302
 The HEW regulations
regarding section 504 state that schools must provide examination
formats that represent students' abilities rather than their disabili-
ties. 303
 The modifications that schools provide to a disabled student
must merely be a means of more accurately measuring the student's
abilities. They must not be a means of giving the student a com-
petitive advantage. If universities follow this provision, the substan-
tive nature of tests will be the same for both handicapped and non-
handicapped students. Thus, there is no justification for viewing
the test results differently. If a modified test accurately measures a
student's abilities, flagging will unfairly prejudice the handicapped
student. 304
 Hence, flagging is unnecessary and discriminates against
handicapped persons.
•	 Some universities, however, may argue that flagging students'
records is necessary to maintain overall consistency. As some pro-
fessors are likely to provide more modifications than other profes-
sors, flagging allows these differences to be taken into account when
evaluating a disabled student's academic record. Flagging students'
501 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the legislative history that stresses the anti-discrimination purpose of section
504.
"2
 See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal oppor-
tunity purpose of section 504.
3°2
 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(c) (1989).
See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 254.
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records, however, is an inadequate means of providing consistency
because it is, by nature, inconsistent. When a school official reviews
a student's marked academic record, it will be within the sole dis-
cretion of that particular person to decide how much weight should
be given to each modification. Furthermore, when outside sources,
such as prospective employers who do not understand the validity
of modifications, evaluate a handicapped student's academic record,
a record of accommodations may adversely prejudice the employers'
attitude towards the student's capabilities.
Therefore, instead of flagging, schools should use less preju-
dicial methods for ensuring consistency and equality among hand,...."
icapped and non-handicapped students. For example, a university
could organize a faculty resource guide that details acceptable mod-
ifications that teachers can use in evaluating disabled students. 945
Such a resource guide should provide faculty with information
about section 504 requirements, campus disability services, and list
various disabilities and the possible accommodations that instructors
could make for each disability. 506
 It should also encourage profes-
gors to discuss specific modifications about which they are unsure
with the campus disability center.
Providing this type of general framework within which the
instructor has some options helps ensure consistent accommoda-
tions while allowing for modifications that meet the specific needs
of different disabilities. Furthermore, a university, by listing valid
accommodations in a resource guide, will help ease some of its
instructors' understandable doubts concerning the validity of these
modifications. 507
 Thus, if universities establish fair and consistent
programs for providing modifications, flagging is unnecessary.
In sum, courts should hold that flagging violates section 504
because it amounts to implicit discrimination against the students
whose tests are marked. As long as schools follow the HEW regu-
lations and only provide handicapped students with exam modifi-
cations that more accurately measure the students' abilities, flagging
is unnecessary because the students will not receive a competitive
advantage. Furthermore, to provide the necessary consistency in
modifications, schools should establish guidelines for professors in-
dicating what types of modifications they may provide.
"3 See, e.g., ALTERNATIVES, supra note 282, at 28-29.
"6 See, e.g., id.
3°7 See SMITH, supra note 65, at 12.
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C. The Limited Cost Defense Under Section 504
Under section 504, schools must provide reasonable accom-
modations for their handicapped students to help ensure equal
opportunities for these students. 308
 An issue regarding this reason-
able accommodations requirement is the extent to which cost plays
a role in a school's obligation to provide accommodations. 309 Spe-
cifically, universities have expressed concerns over the costs involved
in HEW's regulatory provision mandating that universities provide
learning disabled students with necessary auxiliary aids.") Although
HEW responded to universities' cost concerns in an appendix to
the regulations, it did not explicitly state whether a university could
ever use excessive cost as a defense to noncompliance with section
504. 3 "
Based on what HEW did state, it appears that courts would
interpret such a defense narrowly, if they allowed it at all. HEW,
although recognizing cost as a legitimate concern of schools in terms
of the auxiliary aids requirement, emphasized that colleges and
universities usually will not have to pay for auxiliary aids because
outside sources, such as rehabilitation agencies and charitable or-
ganizations, will help the schools in providing aids. 3 ' 2 Furthermore,
even where universities will have to provide auxiliary aids them-
selves, HEW stressed that the regulations give universities great
flexibility in meeting the requirement.313 Thus, HEW's position ap-
pears to be that although it recognizes cost as a problem, it views
discrimination as the greater problem. Consequently, although
schools can first look to outside agencies and volunteers for help in
providing auxiliary aids, if those avenues fail, universities must
provide the aids themselves. Thus, it appears unlikely that HEW
intended a cost defense under the regulations.
1. The Unsuitability of Applying Employers' Statutory Cost
Defense to Schools
Section 504 itself does not provide universities with an explicit
cost defense. A 1978 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, however,
30" See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2), 84.44(a) (1989).
333 Id. § 84 App. A (31).
31° 'Id.
311
	 id.
312 Id. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of resources that
schools can use in providing auxiliary aids to their handicapped students.
313
 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A (31).
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allows courts to consider cost in determining the extent to which
employers must provide accommodations for their handicapped
employees. 314 One commentator has argued that this amendment
should also be applicable to schools." 5
 He argues that otherwise,
section 504 would be too unreasonable because cost compliance
could be severe in some instances. For example, if many handi-
capped students required an expensive auxiliary aid that outside
agencies could not provide, a school would have to incur the costs
of providing the expensive aid to all of its handicapped students
who needed it. For a school without adequate financial resources,
this cost could threaten the economic viability of the school's pro-
grams. Thus, this commentator argues that an undue financial bur-
den defense should be allowed for colleges and universities in sec-
tion 504 claims.'"
This defense, however, should not and need not rest on the
statutory amendment relating to employers. Under section 504
claims, the statutory interpretation doctrine of expressio unius should
apply. Under this doctrine, the expression of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of another thing not so mentioned. 317
 If the
legislature had wanted institutions of higher education to perform
a cost/benefit analysis in every situation where accommodation is
necessary, it would have specifically provided for such analysis as it
did for employers. 3 t 8 Consequently, as the amendment explicitly
provides for cost analysis in employment, but not academic, situa-
tions, the legislature must have intended that different cost analyses
apply for the different situations.
Moreover, the broad cost defense standard that the amendment
articulates for employers should not apply to universities because a
university will usually incur a much lower cost risk in admitting a
disabled student than an employer in hiring a handicapped em-
ployee. 9 E 9 For example, if a handicapped student is unable to com-
plete a school's academic program, even after provision of accom-
modations, only the student generally is adversely affected in the
form of failing grades. Conversely, in the employment situation, if
accommodations for a disabled employee do not succeed and the
31'
	 U.S.C. 794a(a)(1) (1990), See Note, supra note 84, at 900.
313 See Note, supra note 84, at 900.
al6 Id.
317 BLacit's LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
313 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)(1) (1990).
319 See Rothstein, supra note 7, at 250.
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employee is unable to master the work, this outcome results in direct
costs to the employer in lost productivity. Although in both situa-
tions, the university and the employer incur costs of providing the
accommodations, only the employer incurs the additional cost of
lost profits. It seems fair to provide a broader cost defense to
employers than to universities.
Furthermore, universities that have students majoring in spe-
cial education have at their fingertips a vast resource of possible
volunteers to help in providing aids. For example, universities can
provide course credits to those persons majoring in special educa-
tion who serve as interpreters and note-takers. Employers do not
have this luxury. Thus, because universities are more likely than
employers to incur lower costs in providing accommodations, the
undue financial burden defense for employers should not apply to
schools.
2. The Judicially Developed Undue Financial Burden Defense
Institutions of higher education need not rely on the amend-
ment pertaining to employers for a cost defense because courts
have developed an undue financial burden analysis to deal with the
issue of schools' costs in providing reasonable accommodations to
learning disabled students. 32° Under this analysis, it appears that
the courts will interpret the cost defense very narrowly. For exam-
ple, in 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Board of Trustees for University of Alabama,
indicated that section 504 did not require schools to make program
modifications that would cause them to experience an "undue fi-
nancial burden."321
 Thus, a school might be able to use cost as a
defense to noncompliance with section 504's requirement that
schools provide reasonable accommodations for their handicapped
students when it can show an undue financial burden.
The source of this defense appears to derive from the reason-
ing behind the "essential to the program" exception found in the
regulations.s 22
 This reasoning suggests that in complying with sec-
'2° United States v. Board of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740, 748 (1990). See
supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the likely narrow scope of an
undue financial burden test in section 504 litigation.
" I See 908 F.2d at 748.
'22 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1989).
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tion 504, schools should not have to provide accommodations that
would fundamentally alter or lower the standards of their academic
programs. 323 It appears that only where the cost of accommodations
are so great that provision of them would fundamentally alter the
program could a school validly assert the cost defense.
In Board of Trustees for University of Alabama, the court upheld
this narrow interpretation of the undue cost defense when it held
that financial needs tests violated section 504. 324 In order to cut
costs, the defendant school had instituted financial needs tests
whereby it would not provide handicapped students with auxiliary
aids unless the students could show that they were financially unable
to provide the aids themselves. 325 The Board of Trustees court, in
applying a strict cost defense standard, reasoned that because the
school had not proven that providing the auxiliary aids would un-
duly burden it financially, the school had to provide the aids in
compliance with section 504.326 Thus, it appears that only when the
provision of aids would make a program economically unfeasible
may a school effectively use the undue cost defense. 327
Moreover, the Board of Trustees court stressed the many alter-
natives available to the school in providing auxiliary aids, such as
using rehabilitation agencies' aids and recruiting volunteer students
to act as note-takers and readers. 328 The Board of Trustees court's
recognition of the flexibility of a school in providing accommoda-
tions affirms HEW's stance that, although cost is a legitimate con-
cern, providing handicapped students with equal access to higher
education is a far greater concern. 329 Consequently, courts will likely
interpret the excessive cost defense very narrowly.
This narrow interpretation of the cost defense is also consistent
with the legislative history of section 504. In enacting section 504,
Congress stressed that one of its purposes was to provide equal
access to higher education for handicapped students. 33° For the
hearing-impaired student in Board of Trustees, an interpreter was
the only way to get equal access to the academic programs of the
525 Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Ch-. 1988).
521 908 F.2d at 752.
525 Id. at 742.
525 Id. at 748.
522 See id; see also Note, supra note 84, at 903.
528 908 F.2d at 745, 749 n.5.
525 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A (31) (1989).
550 118 Conic. REC. 525 (1972).
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school."' If the courts broadly construe the cost defense for uni-
versities, it will be too easy for schools to deny handicapped students
access to academic programs. Conversely, the strict undue financial
burden standard for the cost defense will rarely allow a university
to deny handicapped students equal access. This strict standard
forces institutions of higher education to become more knowledge-
able about the vast resources available to them in providing aids. 332
3. Suggestions for Schools to Ease the Financial Burden of
Providing Reasonable Accommodations
If universities organize their disability services programs effec-
tively, the costs for providing aids can be kept to a minimum. To
provide cost-efficient accommodations for disabled students, schools
should set up a disability center on campus. This center should be
responsible for directing students to rehabilitation agencies and
charitable organizations that will provide necessary auxiliary aids to
handicapped students. The staff of the center should also develop
friendly relationships with staff from other universities' disability
centers in order to keep abreast of innovative and inexpensive
programs that other schools have developed. If a university imple-
ments an effective program, it should publish a handbook detailing
the program for other universities. Universities should also develop
working relationships with handicapped organizations such as
HEATH, a national clearinghouse on postsecondary education for
handicapped individuals. Such organizations can provide invaluable
information on providing effective accommodations at low costs." 3
In sum, although section 504 and its regulations make no ex-
plicit mention of the availability of a cost defense, courts have
implied that where a school's provision of accommodations for their
handicapped students would impose an undue financial burden on
a school, a school can use excessive cost as a valid defense to non-
compliance with section 504. It appears, however, that courts will
interpret this cost defense narrowly. Thus, universities must make
full use of existing resources, such as charitable and rehabilitation
agencies, volunteer students, and other schools to help provide the
"' 908 F.2d at 748.
"2
 For example, HEATH (Higher Education and the Handicapped) and AHSSPPE
(Association of Handicapped Student Service Programs in Postsecondary Education) are
organizations that can furnish schools with information about providing aids.
'" See, e.g., 7 HEATH RESOURCE CENTER, INFORMATION FROM HEATH, No. 2, at 7
(1988).
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accommodations that handicapped students need, and that section
504 mandates.
D. The Limited Role of Academic Deference in Determining Reasonable
Accommodations
Another issue related to schools' duty to provide reasonable
accommodations for handicapped students concerns HEW's "essen-
tial to the program" regulation. 334 Under this regulation, schools do
not have to modify any academic requirements that are essential to
their programs of study. Some commentators are concerned over
the extent to which universities can claim a requirement is essential
to their program in order to avoid modifying the requirement for
handicapped students. Specifically, courts are in conflict as to what
extent they should defer to a school's academic decision that a
requirement is essential.'" Upon analyzing the underlying reason-
ing and the specific academic requirements at issue in the conflicting
decisions, however, one can establish a workable standard for courts
to use that will more fairly balance the legitimate interests of both
the school and the handicapped student in deciding section 504
claims.
This conflict regarding the role of academic deference in sec-
tion 504 litigation exists in part because of the ambiguous language
of the HEW regulations. 336 In particular, the provision of the reg-
ulations that requires schools to make academic modifications to
prevent discrimination allows for an exception to this requirement
where a school, can demonstrate that the academic requirement is
essential. The regulations, however, do not detail the school's bur-
den of proof in demonstrating that the academic requirement is
essential to its program of study. Thus, Congress left the judiciary
to develop this area with little guidance from the regulations.
Courts, however, have further muddled the issue of essential aca-
demic requirements by employing, to various degrees, the doctrine
of academic deference, a doctrine that has historically required
courts to defer to purely academic decisions that university faculty
make . 337
"4 45 C.F.R. 84.44(a) (1989).
335 Compare Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 1991) with
Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, at *23-24
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988).
"° See 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1989).
337 E.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 475 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985). See supra
notes 199-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of academic deference.
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I...Attempts to Balance the Doctrine of Academic Deference with
Section 504's Reasonable Accommodations Requirement
Courts have disagreed over how much weight they should give
the doctrine of academic deference in resolving section 504
claims.'" For example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, illustrated the importance
of academic deference when it held that the defendant optometry
school did not have to waive a course requirement for a handi-
capped student."9 In Doherty, the court noted that judicial deference
to a faculty's academic decisions is important because the judiciary
is usually unsuited to evaluate such decisions. 34° Although the court
agreed with the school's contention that the course requirement was
essential, it did not, however, absolutely defer to the academic judg-
ment of the school."' Instead, the Doherty court analyzed whether
the course requirement was essential to the program. The court
discerned that the optometry program's proficiency requirement
was reasonably necessary to the program because of safety reasons
and because, in practice, optometrists often used the instruments. 342
Thus, although acknowledging academic deference, the Doherty
court implicitly reasoned that the school still had to demonstrate
that the requirement was reasonably necessary to its program.
The Doherty court then applied a balancing test in which it
examined the legitimate interests of the school in maintaining aca-
demic standards and the interests of the student in receiving the
program degree."' In balancing these interests, the court implicitly
examined whether possible accommodations could serve the needs
of both the school and the student, but concluded that no such
accommodations existed.'" In essence, the Doherty court implicitly
reasoned that although a faculty's decision that an academic re-
232 Compare Wynne, 932 F.2d at 25-26 (stressing judicial responsibility to scrutinize
academic decisions in section 504 claims) with Maki, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7769, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988) (stressing substantial judicial deference to purely
academic decisions).
139 862 F.2d 570, 574-76 (6th Cir. 1988).
140 Id. at 576.
"' See Id. at 574-75.
" Id. at 574.
'' See Id. at 575.
"4 See id. As the necessary skill that the requirement tested was a hands•on, technical
skill, the only possible accommodation that the school could have provided would have been
a waiver of the requirement. Because the Doherty court reasoned that the requirement was
reasonably necessary to the degree sought, it concluded that a waiver would constitute an
unreasonable accommodation and consequently, it was not required under section 504.
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quirement is essential should receive some amount of academic
deference, a court may still inquire into whether possible accom-
modations may enable a disabled student to meet the essential re-
quirement. Thus, with respect to section 504 claims, courts will not
necessarily strictly adhere to the doctrine of academic deference.
The Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado decision used
a similar analysis when the court held that the defendant school
violated section 504 when it refused to admit a student with multiple
sclerosis into its psychiatric residency program. 345
 Although ac-
knowledging that it is difficult to second-guess educators about
academic judgments, the court stated that it is sometimes necessary
to do so under section 504.346 In Pushkin, the court, as in Doherty,
deferred to the general academic standards of the school using the
reasonably necessary standard, emphasizing that a school has a valid
interest in maintaining academic standards.347 In examining the
second step of the analysis, the Pushkin court reasoned that because
the university had previously provided the accommodations needed
by the handicapped student to other students, such accommoda-
tions were reasonable and, therefore, were required under section
504. 348
 Thus, the underlying reasoning in both Doherty and Pushkin
illustrates that the courts, while acknowledging the doctrine of ac-
ademic deference, will still examine whether reasonable accommo-
dations exist that will enable the student to meet the school's aca-
demic standards.
2. Strict Adherence to Academic Deference: An Incorrect
Standard Under Section 504
Other courts, however, have interpreted academic deference
more strictly in section 504 litigation, thus further muddling the
issue of determining whether academic requirements are essential.
For example, in both Anderson v. University of Wisconsin and Aloia v.
New York Law School, the courts also deferred to the schools' deter-
mination of the necessity of maintaining academic standards, and
upheld the essential nature of maintaining minimum grade stan-
345
 504 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (ll. Colo. 1981).
546 Id. The Pushkin court applied the two•step analysis implicit in Doherty: first, in light
of the doctrine of academic deference, are the school's requirements reasonably necessary?;
and second, if the requirements are necessary, are there any reasonable accommodations
available whereby the student can meet the essential requirements in a way that will not
fundamentally alter the requirement?
543
 See id.
"6 See id. at 1295.
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dards. 3" Anderson and Aloia, however, then deviated from the de-
cisions in Pushkin and Doherty. The Anderson and Aloia courts failed
to apply the second step of the analysis—the inquiry into whether
reasonable accommodations would enable a handicapped student
to satisfy a school's requirements. Consequently, the courts in An-
derson and Aloia did not inquire into the existence of possible rea-
sonable accommodations that the schools could make so the students
could meet the schools' essential minimum grade requirements.
Rather, those courts ended their analysis when they deferred to the
schools' academic requirement of minimum grade standards. Thus,
the Anderson and Aloia courts adhered to the doctrine of academic
deference.
Recognizing that a school has a valid interest in maintaining
academic standards, however, does not necessarily imply that a
school does not have to provide reasonable accommodations that
will enable a handicapped student to meet the academic standards
of the school. For example, if learning disabled students are not
provided with reasonable modifications, such as alternate test for-
mats, that more accurately reflect their abilities rather than their
disabilities, many of these students will be unable to maintain a
school's minimum required GPA. Without the necessary accom-
modations, learning disabled students' GPAs will not reflect their
true abilities. Rather, their grades will more likely reflect their dis-
abilities because many traditional exam formats inherently discrim-
inate against learning disabled students in that they measure learn-
ing disabled students' disabilities, not their abilities.
For example, a written essay examination will only reflect the
learning disability of a student who has difficulty in processing and
sending handwritten information. 350 On the other hand, if a school
provided that student with an alternate method of recording the
answers, such as taping or typing, the answers would reflect the
student's abilities. Thus, when schools provide their learning dis-
abled students with reasonable accommodations to ensure nondis-
crimination, the students are better able to meet the schools' aca-
demic requirements. Consequently, although the doctrine of
academic deference is relevant, section 504 mandates that a court
not end its analysis when it determines that a requirement is essen-
tial because otherwise, discrimination is likely.
3" Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, at
*23-24 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 741 (7th Cir.
1988).
"11 See generally HEATH RESOURCE. CENTER, supra note 61, at I, 4.
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3. Limiting the Role of Academic Deference in Section 504
Litigation: The Correct Standard
Although the Aloia and Anderson courts applied strict deference
to schools' academic decisions, in the 1991 case of Wynne v. Tufts
University School of Medicine, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit refused to apply the academic deference doctrine
strictly."' The Wynne court explicitly applied the standard implicitly
found in Doherty and Pushltin. 352 Consequently, the Wynne court
correctly balanced the doctrine of academic deference with the
policies behind section 504.
The court in Wynne did acknowledge the doctrine of academic
deference in considering whether it should defer to the defendant
medical school's decision that multiple choice tests were essential to
its program. 5" This reasoning of the Wynne court is in line with the
Anderson and Aloia courts in that it upholds the right of schools to
set academic standards for their programs of study. 554 The court in
Wynne, however, did not defer to Tufts' conclusion that multiple
choice tests are the only mechanism for evaluating the ability to
process complex information. 555 The court determined that if rea-
sonable accommodations are available that will enable a disabled
student to meet the required academic standard, a school's failure
to provide such accommodations to disabled students violates sec-
tion 504. Thus, although the Wynne court deferred to the general
academic standard that Tufts had an interest in maintaining, the
court then examined whether reasonable accommodations might be
available that would allow Wynne to meet the school's required
academic standard. As a result, because the Wynne court concluded
that reasonable accommodations might be available, it reversed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment for Tufts. 556
This two-step analysis of the Wynne court effectively balances
the doctrine of academic deference and the policies behind section
504. In deferring to Tufts' academic standards, the court recognized
that such academic decisions require a faculty's expert evaluation.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged the importance of academic
"' 932 F.2d 19, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1991).
352 See id.
353 Id.
"4 See id. at 26-27; Aloia v. New York Law School, No. 88 Civ. 3184, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7769, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1988); Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737,
741 (7th Cir. 1988).
335 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d at 27-28.
ash
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autonomy. 357 This deference with respect to general academic stan-
dards is consistent with the judicial determination that in complying
with section 504, universities do not have to lower their standards
or make fundamental changes to their programs. 358 Thus, the
Wynne court, while acknowledging the academic deference doctrine,
emphasized that section 504 requires courts to examine academic
decisions to ensure that schools do not discriminate against handi-
capped students.
Moreover, strict adherence to academic deference, as found in
Anderson, is inappropriate because the legislative history of section
504 stresses the importance of equal opportunity. One of the pur-
poses of section 504 is to provide handicapped students with equal
access to higher education. 559
 In order to effectuate this purpose,
the HEW regulations specifically mandate that universities provide
learning disabled students with reasonable accommodations where
necessary to prevent discrimination. 360 If courts apply a standard
of strict deference to any academic decision that universities make,
schools could easily circumvent the regulatory requirements by
merely deciding that any given requirement is so essential that it
cannot be modified at all. Basically, the schools would be the •sole
determiners of whether an accommodation is reasonable in a given
situation. If the courts had to defer to such academic decisions, they
could not enforce section 504.
Therefore, under section 504, courts should scrutinize aca-
demic decisions that conclude that no accommodations would be
reasonable for an academic requirement. This scrutiny would not
detract from a school's right to set its own academic standards. That
is, because the regulations provide that a school does not have to
modify the requirements that it proves are essential, a school can
still maintain the integrity of its program.
Judicial scrutiny of academic requirements to determine
whether there are reasonable accommodations that will enable a
student to fulfill a school program's essential requirements also
furthers the policy of section 504. Section 504 forces universities to
become more knowledgeable about students' learning disabilities.
357
 See id. at 26.
3" See Id. at 27-28; see also Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570,
574 (6th Cir. 1988).
359 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history announcing the equal opportunity purpose behind section 504.
360 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1989).
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As a result, the historical suspicions and misunderstandings sur-
rounding learning disabilities will decline, and universities will be
better able to provide effective and equitable accommodations. Con-
sequently, schools will be less likely to claim that a requirement is
essential to its program, and more likely to seek reasonable accom-
modations for their handicapped students to enable them to satisfy
schools' academic requirements.
The Wynne analysis will also be helpful as other issues arise in
learning disabled students' section 504 claims. One academic con-
cern is that learning disabled students will begin to demand alter-
nate forms of instruction. 361 Thus, the same arguments that the
parties advanced in Wynne will probably arise: schools will claim
that the demand for alternate forms of instruction is a violation of
academic freedom, whereas learning disabled students will contend
that such _a demand is a reasonable accommodation. As in Wynne,
the courts should balance the interests of schools in maintaining
academic standards with the interests of learning disabled students
in receiving equal opportunities in higher education.
In sum, although courts have disagreed over the role that
academic deference should play in section 504 litigation, future
courts should follow the analysis that the court articulated in Wynne.
Under this analysis, courts must scrutinize a school's decision that
an academic standard is essential to its program to determine if that
standard is essential or if it instead amounts to discrimination
against handicapped students. In this determination, courts should
require the school to prove affirmatively that its regulation is essen-
tial. In addition, the Wynne analysis mandates that courts inquire
into the existence of reasonable accommodations that would enable
a handicapped student to satisfy the requirement at issue. 362 If such
accommodations exist, courts must require schools to provide them
for their handicapped students. This approach more fairly balances
the legitimate interests of schools in maintaining valid academic
standards and the academic interests of handicapped students.
Thus, a required inquiry into reasonable accommodations helps
ensure that handicapped students receive equal opportunities to
pursue higher education.
58 Telephone interview with Karen Muncaster, Director of Learning Disabilities Office,
Middlesex Community College (Sept. 20, 1990).
362 See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1991).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although there are still some unresolved questions regarding
knowledge, cost and academic deference in section 504 claims,
courts have provided guidance for both disabled students and in-
stitutions of higher education. With regard to knowledge, the bur-
den is clearly on the student to provide sufficient knowledge of a
learning disability to the school. To receive the full benefits -of
section 504, learning disabled students should provide the docu-
mentation as early as possible in their academic careers. The doc-
umentation should also be as complete as possible, including phys-
icians' reports, past history of the disability, if available, and possible
accommodations that would benefit the handicapped student. Al-
though the law is not clear on how much documentation is sufficient
to trigger section 504 coverage, the more information that the
student provides about the disability, the more likely the school will
be subject to section 504. Moreover, a court will more likely examine
reasonable accommodations in deciding whether the school violated
section 504 if documentation is provided.
Although students should give schools documentation of their
disabilities, schools should not use this knowledge to flag disabled
students' tests. Flagging is discriminatory in nature. It assumes that
the modified tests that learning disabled students take are less valid
than those tests of non-disabled students. The HEW regulations
require schools to provide only the modifications that will make
tests equal in substance. Thus, if schools follow this regulation,
flagging will be unnecessary as the substantive nature of the tests
will be the same. Even if the modified tests provide a competitive
advantage to the handicapped students, there is still no reason for
flagging. Instead, the school should find modifications that provide
an equal playing field for handicapped and non-handicapped stu-
dents alike. These modifications avoid the discrimination that flag- .
ging encourages.
With regard to cost issues, under the regulations, schools must
pay for necessary and reasonable accommodations such as auxiliary
aids. Thus, with respect to the reasonable accommodations that
HEW requires schools to provide, it appears that courts will only
allow a narrow cost defense. Consequently, in order to use effec-
tively a cost defense to the provision of aids, schools must prove
that the provision of the aids threatens the economic feasibility of
the program. This burden of proof furthers the policies of section
504, ensuring equal access to higher education for disabled individ-
uals.
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Although conflict exists among the courts as to how much
weight they should give to a school's determination that an academic
requirement is necessary, the Wynne court provided a workable
standard by balancing the interests of a school in maintaining aca-
demic standards and the interests of a handicapped student in
receiving equal access to higher education. By deferring to general
academic standards, such as the minimum grade requirements,
courts can preserve the freedom of universities to establish academic
standards. Yet, by inquiring into the possibility of reasonable accom-
modations that would enable a disabled student to meet an academic
standard, courts can, at the same time, fulfill section 504's purpose
of equal opportunity. As different types of academic standards and
accommodations will be involved in future cases, the judiciary
should perform a case-by-case determination of whether reasonable
accommodations exist by applying the Wynne court's analysis of
scrutinizing academic requirements to determine if they are essen-
tial to a school's program and examining whether reasonable ac-
commodations exist that would enable a handicapped student to
meet the requirements at issue.
Most importantly, both schools and learning disabled students
must understand the scope of section 504. Although section 504
affords learning disabled students protection against unfair discrim-
ination, these students must remember that section 504 is a civil
rights act that calls only for equal opportunity. Schools must realize
that providing equal access may, in some instances, require the
provision of accommodations. As schools and learning disabled stu-
dents more clearly understand their rights and obligations under
section 504, they will be better able to work together to dispel,
forever, the myth that learning disabled students are uneducable.
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